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10 Goethe’s Exploratory 
Idealism
Mattias Pirholt
“One has to always experiment with ideas.”
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg
“Everything that exists is an analogue to all existing things.”
Johann Wolfgang Goethe
Johann Wolfgang Goethe made his famous Italian journey in the late 
1780s, approaching his forties, and it was nothing short of life-c hanging. 
Soon after his arrival in Rome on November 1, 1786, he writes to his 
mother that he would return “as a new man”1; in the retroactive account 
of the journey in Italienische Reise, he famously describes his entrance 
into Rome “as my second natal day, a  true rebirth.”2 Latter- day crit-
ics essentially confirm Goethe’s reflections, describing the journey and 
its outcome as “Goethe’s aesthetic catharsis” (Dieter Borchmeyer), “the 
artist’s self-d iscovery” (Theo Buck), and a “Renaissance of Goethe’s po-
etic genius” (Jane Brown).3 Following a decade of frustrating unproduc-
tivity, the Italian sojourn unleashed previously unseen creative powers 
which would deeply affect Goethe’s life and work over the decades to 
come. Borchmeyer argues that Goethe’s “new existence in Weimar bore 
an essentially different signature than his pre- Italian one.”4 With this, 
Borchmeyer refers to a particular brand of neoclassicism known as Wei-
mar classicism, Weimarer Klassik, which is less an epochal term, seeing 
as it covers only a little more than a decade, than a reference to what 
Gerhard Schulz and Sabine Doering matter-o f- factly call “an episode in 
the creative history of a group of German writers around 1800.”5
Equally important as the aesthetic reorientation, however, was 
Goethe’s new- found interest in science, which was also a direct conse-
quence of his encounter with the Italian nature. “The parallelism, even 
the identity of natural and artistic laws is literally the main theme of the 
Italian Journey,” Borchmeyer summarizes.6 What later would become 
Goethe’s most famous— or perhaps infamous— contributions to science, 
his theory of colors and his morphology, draw on the Italian experience, 
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to which they explicitly refer (cf. MA 12:69; MA 4.2:265). His earli-
est work in other fields of science, such as meteorology and chemistry, 
stems from this period as well, implying a holistic view on nature. John 
Erpenbeck has suggested that the insights into the field of science that 
Goethe gained during his Italian journey were not fundamentally new; 
the experiences, however, enabled him to see scientific connections and 
articulate a more comprehensive scientific worldview. “Italy— that was 
most of all an experience of integration,” Erpenbeck concludes.7
As a result, these two trajectories in Goethe’s post- Italian writing, the 
aesthetic and the scientific, are not merely simultaneous but essentially 
rooted in the same experience. Goethe’s classicist experience, to put it 
succinctly, is a double experience, encompassing both nature and art. 
Or, as Ernst Osterkamp puts it: 
Only what does not deviate from the laws of nature can be classic. 
Thus, in the Italian Journey Goethe did not access the “classical 
soil” primarily as an antiquary or art lover but as a scientist, that is 
from the point of view of its natural conditions.8 
In other words, Goethe’s conception of classicism in aesthetics is inti-
mately associated with how nature is construed from a scientific point 
of view. The consequences of this double experience would unfold in the 
decade that followed the Italian journey. As Jutta Van Selm explains, 
Goethe’s mature thinking “bears completely upon the Italian experi-
ence,” and, as a result, there are “unmistakable parallels between the 
Italian experience and Goethe’s later theories on science and art.”9
This chapter will look at the methodological parallels between 
Goethe’s aesthetic writings and his scientific theories of the post- Italian, 
classicist period, which stretches from the return to Weimar in 1788 to 
Schiller’s death in 1805. Focusing on Goethe’s theoretical reflections in 
both of these fields, this chapter will unveil an essentially experimental, 
exploratory, collective, and open- ended conception of both art and na-
ture. In science as well as in aesthetics, man’s pursuit of knowledge and 
beauty is epitomized by a never- ending search for an underlying idea. 
As we will see, this regulative idea is repeatedly made visible in often 
ephemeral manifestations of individual works of art and scientific exper-
iments. Only by observing series of manifestations— reproductions of 
both images and experiments— is the idea made graspable. Despite being 
empirically present, it is not immediately perceivable but experienceable 
by means of exploratory investigation.
Furthermore, this exploratory idealism, I will argue, challenges much 
of what we take for granted in Weimar classicist aesthetics. For a long 
time, scholars have agreed that one of the key features of Weimar clas-
sicism, perhaps even the key feature, is aesthetic autonomy. It has been 
labeled the norm and the core of Weimar classicism,10 and Wilhelm 
Goethe’s Exploratory Idealism 219
Voßkamp has concluded, “No other concept is perceived as more char-
acteristic for the epoch of Weimar classicism than aesthetic auton-
omy.”11 However, a comparison between the experimental methodology 
in Goethe’s aesthetic and scientific writings reveals a conspicuous het-
eronomy pertaining to the nature of the work of art, which, as we will 
see, cannot be described in terms of “intensive wholeness,” as Hans- 
Jürgen Schings suggests.12 Rather, the aesthetic exploratory idealism 
that Goethe articulates in his classicist writings arranges the individual 
work in a sequence that points toward a regulative idea. This kind of 
sequencing of the work of art is analogous to the Goethean brand of 
experimental scientific methodology— which  I will outline in the next 
section— pointing to a deep- seated experiential link between aesthetics 
and science. In other words, although Goethe does not conflate science 
and aesthetics, there is a common methodological denominator that joins 
the two fields, forming an analogical connection between them. Thus, 
this chapter will investigate two forms of heteronomy: a weaker form, 
which consists in the experiential link between science and art, to which 
Osterkamp and Van Selm have drawn attention and which is visible in 
the methodological homology between science and art, and a stronger 
form, which pertains to the heteronomy of the aesthetic experience as 
such, that is, its collective and sequential nature.
Experimentalism in the Age of Goethe
By the time Goethe started performing systematic scientific studies in the 
wake of his Italian journey, empirically grounded experimentalism had 
been around for almost two centuries. Galileo Galilei, who conducted 
experiments in the early seventeenth century, was supposedly the first 
practical experimentalist in the modern sense of the word,13 and around 
the same time, philosophers started laying the theoretical foundation of 
experimental knowledge. Francis Bacon, in the introduction to Novum 
Organum (1620), famously argued that new knowledge is obtained not 
through argument but through experience.14 In the decades and centu-
ries that followed, empirical experiments (as opposed to thought exper-
iments) became more prevalent, gaining solid philosophical ground in 
the works of Locke and Hume, among many others, who emphasized 
the a posteriori nature of all knowledge. Simultaneously, experimental 
practices evolved, establishing conventions for the relationship between 
hypotheses, experiments, and conclusions, and assigning mathemat-
ics a key role in scientific knowledge production. On German soil, Georg 
Lichtenberg and Kant provided the practical and the theoretical impe-
tuses of experimentalism.
Still, around 1800, the reach and limits of experiments were yet not 
fixed. For the romantic, post- Kantian scientists and philosophers, the 
means and the goals of experimental science pointed far beyond what was 
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empirically given toward a total understanding of man and nature. The 
ultimate goal was an omniferous theory of nature, which should unify 
everything, including science, art, and politics, into one romantic, essen-
tially poetic (or poietic) principle. Johann Wilhelm Ritter and Alexander 
von Humboldt, among others, used their own bodies as experimental 
objects in order to empirically uncover the fundamental principles of 
life that unify man with nature and the universe.15 From a philosophical 
point of view, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, in his philosophy of 
nature— or speculative physics, as he revealingly calls it— construes the 
experiment as a kind of prophetic invasion of the construction of nature 
that produces the phenomena it wishes to investigate.16 The grand ambi-
tion manifests itself perfectly in Novalis’s unfinished (and perhaps also 
unfinishable) encyclopedic Allgemeine Brouillon, composed in 1798 and 
1799. Here, the author— or rather editor— collects and comments on ex-
cerpts from a multitude of sources, including Humboldt, Kurt Sprengel, 
and Abraham Gottlob Werner,17 while adding his own aphorisms and 
reflections. In this context, the experiment explicitly constitutes  a  ro-
manticizing art of invention, and the experimental process of observa-
tion is seen simultaneously as ideal (subjective) and real (objective).18
Goethe’s scientific writings offer something of  a  link between 
or  a  combination of the two diametrically opposed worldviews: the 
mathematically based empiricism of the scientific community on the one 
side and the spiritual holism of the romantics on the other side. To be 
sure, Goethe carefully describes all the experiments that he undertook, 
accounting for the premises and outcomes of each and every test. He 
modifies the premises of the experiment systematically in order to infer 
regularities. Thus, he makes sure that others are able to repeat them (in-
deed, a cornerstone of the scientific method). For instance, in “Beiträge 
zur Optik,” Goethe explicitly exhorts amateurs (Liebhaber) of science 
to copy (nachahmen) the included illustrations and, on the basis thereof, 
“repeat the experiments with even more ease and larger success” (MA 
4.2:292). Also, he emphasizes that there is nothing to be found beyond 
the world of phenomena. “Let us not seek for something behind the 
phenomena— they themselves are the theory,” one of his maxims states 
(MA 17:533/CW 12:307): an extreme level of empiricism that almost 
goes beyond the mathematization of the experience in generic science.
Then again, Goethe strived for a comprehensive understanding of na-
ture in its totality, which, according to H. B. Nisbet in his well- known 
book Goethe and the Scientific Tradition (1972), draws on a Neopla-
tonic tradition that emphasizes the unity of nature, including man.19 
Furthermore, there is an autobiographical trait in his scientific work 
that undeniably renders his scientific method a subjective slant. In Zur 
Farbenlehre and Zur Morphologie, Dorothea Kuhn maintains, the au-
tobiographical form is transformed “into the foundation and principle 
of the entire scientific representation.”20 Goethe also engaged in science 
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poetically, particularly in his didactic poems. Poems such as “Die Meta-
morphose der Pflanzen” (1798), “Metamorphose der Tiere” (1798/1799), 
and “Urwort: Orphisch” (1817) were in fact published in his scientific 
journals in order to comment on more traditionally scientific texts. Ac-
cording to Jocelyn Holland, the poems play with the limits of scien-
tific experimentation by pointing to the limits of representation.21 To 
Goethe, then, the wider scope of science is to understand man’s place in 
nature and the harmonious unity between the two.22
This double bind influences one of Goethe’s most important contribu-
tions to the theory of the experiment: the essay “Der Versuch als Ver-
mittler von Objekt und Subjekt,” written in 1792 in connection with his 
early color experiments but published in 1823, with minor revisions and 
with the title added (possibly by Goethe’s secretary Friedrich Wilhelm 
Riemer).23 Wolfgang Krohn argues that Goethe’s conception of the ex-
periment, as articulated in this essay, appears “to circulate within the 
aims of modern science but at the same time to develop a view of the 
relationship between subject and object that is distinct from the concept 
of the experiment in the main tradition.”24 Goethe did not reject the ex-
perimental methods of his contemporaries, Krohn continues; rather, he 
wanted to expand the notion of the experiment, suggesting
that the concept of the experiment, introduced by Bacon and Galilei 
and worked out epistemologically in detail by Kant, carries a construc-
tive feature that best describes the controlled environment of the labo-
ratory sciences, whereas the conditions of experimentation by Goethe 
is epitomized by experience [Erleben], which focuses on the phenom-
ena of the investigation that stand in an open relation to reality.25
Friedrich Steinle, correspondingly, distinguishes between  a  theory- 
oriented conception of the experiment, which constitutes  a  means to 
prove a hypothesis, and an exploratory one, which, as the expression 
reveals, has less to do with proving a point and more to do with pre-
suppositionlessly investigating a phenomenon. While the former is the 
Newtonian approach, which continues to dominate science today, the 
latter, endorsed by Goethe, constitutes an important undercurrent, 
which contemporary science has re- evaluated and refined.26 To be sure, 
this methodology refers not to an unsystematic modus operandi or to the 
use of a spontaneous trial- and- error procedure. Instead, it is more open 
than theory- oriented experimentalism to the concrete result of the con-
ducted experiment as it focuses primarily on the outcome rather than on 
the hypothesis.27 As Steinle shows, Goethe’s works, especially his contri-
butions to the theory of color, are part of this often- ridiculed tradition:
The fundamental procedure consisted in varying different para-
meters of the experimental construction: the form of the monitored 
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surfaces, their size, color and brightness, the angle, from which they 
were observed, the refractive angle of the prism, the kind of glass of 
the prism, and the distance between the prism and the surface. The 
number of experiments conducted in this way could surely reach the 
hundreds.28
Thus,  a  key feature of exploratory experimentalism is the systematic 
sequencing of experiences, a principle that Goethe utilizes in the stron-
gest possible sense, as Steinle shows in his essay. In fact, according to 
Goethe’s definition of the experiment, sequentiality constitutes the sine 
qua non of the concept in question: “When we intentionally reproduce 
empirical evidence found by earlier researchers, contemporary, or our-
selves, when we re- create natural or artificial phenomena, we speak 
of this as an experiment” (MA 4.2:325/CW 12:13; cf. MA 4.2:269). 
Goethe seems to suggest that only in so far as an experience is sequen-
tialized, either through replication or variation, can it be called an ex-
periment.29 As a result, an experiment is never an isolated entity. Quite 
the contrary: an experiment “receives its real value only when united or 
combined with other experiments” (MA 4.2:326/CW 12:13). Compared 
to Newton, who is praised for his experimental rigor but in reality kept 
the amount of experiments to a minimum, Goethe’s experimentalism is 
excessive, fully embracing the exploratory method.30
However, not only the object submitted to the experiment but also the 
subject conducting it is collectively determined. Science, Goethe under-
stood, is essentially a collective process. We do not appreciate enough, 
he says, “our need for communication, assistance, admonition, and con-
tradiction to hold us to the right path and help us along it” (MA 4.2:325/
CW 12:13). In this respect, science differs from art: 
An artist should never present a work to the public before it is fin-
ished because it is difficult for others to advise or help him with its 
production. . . . In science, on the other hand, it is useful to publish 
every bit of empirical evidence, even every conjecture; indeed, no 
scientific edifice should be built until the plan and materials of its 
structure have been widely known, judged and sifted.
(MA 4.2:325/CW 12:13)
To be sure, this understanding of the collective nature of scientific en-
deavors is noticeable in Goethe’s practical work as well, particularly in 
the later journals Zur Morphologie and Zur Naturwissenschaft über-
haupt, which contained contributions by several authors.31
These subjective and objective collective processes at work— the exper-
imental sequences and the collaborations in the scientific community— 
are signs of what James M. Van der Laan has described as Goethe’s 
experimental “polyperspectivity”: “Because reality has an interpretative 
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basis,” Van der Laan argues, “the essay [i.e., “Der Versuch als Ver-
mittler von Objekt und Subjekt”] seeks to illuminate each object or 
topic or issue from numerous different perspectives.”32 The aim of 
these collective processes and repetitions is to “attain certainty” about 
the isolated empirical evidence we find in the experiment, as Goethe 
suggests (MA 4.2:327/CW 12:14). However, this singularity is merely 
apparent since the ultimate object of scientific knowledge is the totality 
of nature: 
All things in nature, especially the commoner forces and elements, 
work incessantly upon one another; we can say that each phenome-
non is connected with countless others just as we can say that a point 
of light floating in space sends its rays in all directions.
(MA 4.2:329/CW 12:15–16)
As a result, “we can never be careful enough in studying what lies next 
to it or derives directly from it” (MA 4.2:329/CW 12:16).  Indeed, the 
ambition of grasping the totality of nature links Goethe’s conception 
of science with the romantic and idealistic tendencies of his time, as 
outlined above. Then again, the desire for totality is also the motivation 
behind Goethe’s exhortation to repeat experiments, which connects him 
with mainstream science. “To follow every single experiment through 
its variations,” he declares, “is the real task of the scientific researcher” 
(MA 4.2:329/CW 12:16). Once again, he contrasts science and poetry, 
maintaining that the writer, “who writes to entertain” (MA 4.2:329/CW 
12:16), must refrain from repetition. Replication, on the other hand, cre-
ates a series (Reihe) of experiments that, together, from a  certain point 
of view, constitutes one experiment and one experience:33
In the first two parts of my Contributions to Optics  I  sought to 
set up a series of contiguous experiments derived from one another 
in this way. Studied thoroughly and understood as a whole, these 
experiments could even be thought of as representing a  single ex-
periment [Einen Versuch], a single piece of empirical evidence [Eine 
Erfahrung] explored in its most manifold variations. 
(MA 4.2:329–30/CW 12:16)
This single experiment and single empirical experience, which consists 
of many experiments and many experiences, “is clearly of a higher sort,” 
Goethe concludes, repeating, “In my view, it is the task of the scientific 
researcher to work toward empirical evidence of this higher sort” (MA 
4.2:330/CW 12:16). The rest of the essay is devoted to explaining this 
particular scientific duty: to develop a higher form of experience on the 
basis of a series of singular experiments. Interestingly, the scientist must 
make use of not only his intellect (Verstand) but also his imagination 
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(Einbildungskraft) and wit (Witz) to construct this higher form of expe-
rience, which is ultimately the aim of the scientific endeavor.
The nature of this scientifically valid higher experience, however, re-
mains somewhat of a mystery throughout the essay on the experiment 
as mediator. A few years later (1798), in a short text, posthumously pub-
lished in 1893 with the title “Erfahrung und Wissenschaft” (renamed 
by later editors as “Das reine Phänomen”), Goethe elaborates further 
on the ultimate aim of science, which, in this context, he labels the pure 
phenomenon. The scientist should focus on “not only how the phenom-
ena appear, but also how they should appear” (MA 6.2:820/CW 12:24). 
As a result, many phenomena constitute what Goethe calls “empirical 
fractions which must be discarded if we are to arrive at  a pure, con-
stant phenomenon,” which explicitly constitutes “a type of ideal” (MA 
6.2:820/CW 12:24). In other words, it is on behalf of “the idea of the 
pure phenomenon” that the fractions of empirical experience are sacri-
ficed (MA 6.2:820/CW 12:24). The pure phenomenon, however, is not 
visible to the naked eye. Rather, it
stands before us as the result of all our observations and experi-
ments. It can never be isolated, but it appears in a continuous se-
quence of events. To depict it, the human mind gives definition to the 
empirically variable, excludes the accidental, sets aside the impure, 
untangles the complicated, and even discovers the unknown. 
(MA 6.2:821/CW 12:25)
As a mediator between the empirical phenomenon, which each and ev-
ery one of us may experience in nature, and the pure phenomenon, iden-
tical to the higher form of experience that Goethe talks about in the 
essay on the experiment as mediator, there is the scientific phenomenon 
to which empirical phenomena “is then raised through experiments . . . 
by producing it under circumstance and conditions different from those 
in which it was first observed, and in sequence which is more or less 
successful” (MA 6.2:821/CW 12:25). The parallels between “Der Ver-
such als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt” and “Das reine Phänomen” 
are striking. In the latter, empirical and pure phenomena substitute ob-
ject and subject, a move that emphasizes an important development in 
Goethe’s scientific thinking. Possibly under the influence of Kant, whose 
philosophy Goethe praises in “Einwirkungen der neueren Philosophie” 
(1820; MA 12:94–95), Goethe clearly makes a  transcendental turn of 
his own as, in the earlier text, he focuses not on the object as such (nor 
on the subject) but on the givenness of the phenomenon.
Similar to the higher experience in “Der Versuch als Vermittler von 
Objekt und Subjekt,” the pure phenomenon, or the “Urphänomen,” as 
it is later renamed, is neither a singularity nor separated from the em-
pirical reality. Quite the contrary: it manifests itself “in a continuous 
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sequence of events.” In other words, the pure phenomenon is intrinsi-
cally empirical but, at the same time, not empirically experienceable as 
such or in isolation— only in the form of a sequence. Joseph Vogl refers 
to the pure phenomenon as a form of “extended or higher empiricism” 
whose aim is nothing less than pure visibleness (reine Sichtbarkeit), 
consisting of a “fabric of sensuousness and idea.”34 Drawing on Herd-
er’s concept of “Hauptform,” Dalia Nassar argues, in a similar vein, 
that Goethe construes similarities and analogies structurally as they 
are “not necessarily to be found in the perceptible appearance, but in 
the structural and formal integrity of the whole.”35 The ideal compo-
nent, I would argue, is important. As Goethe famously claims in the au-
tobiographical account of his first encounter with Schiller, “Glückliches 
Ereignis,” published in Zur Morphologie (1817), he was able to “have 
ideas without knowing it” and capable of “see[ing] them with [his] own 
eyes” (MA 12:89/CW 12:20).36 However, the Goethean idea— the pure 
phenomenon— is not (Neo)platonic since it does not constitute a more 
genuine or original reality from which the empirical reality emanates. 
Rather, as “the result of all our observations and experiments,” it rep-
resents a regulative idea of the scientific endeavor, inseparable from the 
sequence of experiences from which it is constructed. Once again, the 
influence of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is evident. According to 
him, the direction of our understanding (Verstand) toward a particular 
goal, the desire to seek unity and completeness in nature, for instance, 
constitutes a regulative principle of reason (Vernunft).37 Goethe, cor-
respondingly, construes the pure phenomenon as such  a  goal, which 
should encompass all of nature. Unlike Kant, however, Goethe consid-
ers the idea to be empirical in the sense that it is experienceable, though 
not immediately but as the result of sequential experience. “Only at 
the end of the experimental sequence is the sought- after rule rectified,” 
Sabine Schimma maintains, “and thus scientifically verified.”38 To be 
sure, the rule of the “Urphänomen,” which is generated “experimen-
tally and processually from  a  multitude of isolated occurrences” but 
which, at the same time, “is experienceable in each individual phenom-
enon,” constitutes  a  “sensorily experienceable and likewise abstract 
totality.”39
In that sense, Goethe’s pure phenomenon is constantly reconstructed 
as a result of the experiences (empirical and scientific) made by the ex-
perimenting subject. New experiences add to the experience of the pure 
phenomenon, which, as a regulative principle, is not experienceable as 
such but is noticeable in the continuously evolving totality of experi-
ences. The subject itself, correspondingly, evolves as a result of the ex-
perimental enterprise: “[T]he more we pursue this study,” Goethe claims 
in “Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt,” “discovering 
further relations among things, the more we will exercise our innate gift 
of observation” (MA 4.2:322/CW 12:12).
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To summarize the discussion so far, Goethe’s concept of the experi-
ment displays the following characteristics, which both conform and are 
at odds with the notion of the experiment of his peers:
1  experiments are serialized and controlled empirical experiences, 
warranting replication and variation;
2  experimental experiences are essentially collective and communica-
tive, that is, they must be experienceable by the scientific community;
3  the scientific process is ultimately regulated by a simultaneously ex-
perienceable and abstract idea, the pure phenomenon, which is in-
ferable from the series of experiments and constantly reconstructed.
What this means, in short, is that the series of controlled experiments 
to which the scientific community contributes pertains to forming a 
pre liminary image (“Über die Notwendigkeit von Hypothesen,” MA 
3.2:298). This image is increasingly refined and perfected by means of 
said experiments, that is, scientific phenomena, which point to the ideal 
pure phenomenon. Since the pure phenomenon is both empirical and 
ideal, continuous reconstruction of knowledge is necessary: the idea and 
the experience affect each other reciprocally and constantly.
The Sequencing of the Work of Art in Goethe’s  
Classicist Aesthetics
To be sure, the leap from science to aesthetics in Goethe’s oeuvre is never 
far. As a matter of fact, Goethe construes deep ties between them, ar-
guing that science is essentially rooted in poetry. Lamenting the tepid 
reception of his early work on morphology, Versuch die Metamorphose 
der Pflazen zu erklären (1790), he claims that the critics forgot that “sci-
ence has developed from poetry” and that “one did not consider that 
both could very well once again, after a change of times, come together 
in a friendly manner at a higher level, for the benefit of them both” (MA 
12:74). Furthermore, art is, as Goethe maintains in a posthumously pub-
lished aphorism, “a second nature that is also mysterious but more intel-
ligible, since it originates from reason” (MA 17:903, #1105).
Despite these ties, critics habitually link his conception of art with 
aesthetic autonomy. His classicist writings of the 1790s and early 1800s, 
particularly, are construed as an expression of the autonomization of 
art, which traditionally is assumed to be heralded in the works of Karl 
Philipp Moritz and Kant. Key features of aesthetic autonomy, particu-
larly in the tradition of Moritz, which focuses primarily on the nature 
of the work of art and, to some extent, the creative process, include 
the completeness (Vollkommenheit), totality (Ganzheit), and internal 
purposiveness (innere Zweckmäßigkeit) of the work of art.40 In other 
words, it is assumed to constitute a self- contained, organic totality that 
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lacks external purposes, which may be secondary at most. Although 
Goethe was well- read in Kant’s philosophy, its particular emphasis on 
the subject’s disinterestedness seems however to have left few traces in 
Goethe’s writings on aesthetics.41A closer look at Goethe’s aesthetic 
writings from his classicist period reveals a heteronomous conception of 
the work of art. As a matter of fact, the heteronomization of the work 
draws on his classicist experience, that is, his experience during his Ital-
ian sojourn, of the ideality of the works of the classical age and the Re-
naissance. The ideality of these works— the Laocoön group, the Apollo 
Belvedere, Raphael’s Transfiguration, and Leonardo’s Last Supper, for 
instance— does not isolate the aesthetic experience to one particular ver-
sion. On the contrary, the idea of the work, as we will see, constitutes 
the ultimate aim of the aesthetic experience, which is formed over time 
as the experience engages with various manifestations of the same idea. 
Thus, Goethe draws on this sequential experience of the work’s idea in 
order to form, as in his scientific work, a polyperspective or pluralized 
view of the idea.
The Italian journey is what opened Goethe’s eyes to the heteronomy of 
the work of art and the processual nature of the aesthetic experience.42 
His first- hand encounters with masterpieces from Greek and Roman an-
tiquity, as well as from the Italian Renaissance, are described in detail 
in Italienische Reise, which is essentially a cultural and aesthetic tour de 
force. Indeed, seeing the antique marbles and Renaissance paintings, and 
encountering the Italian nature and lifestyle, contributed to his feeling of 
rebirth. Goethe remarks, however, that these works are not entirely new 
to him. In his account of the Italian journey, after having beheld Rapha-
el’s ceiling paintings in Villa Farnesina and the Transfiguration, he refers 
to them as “All old acquaintances” (MA 15:162/CW 6:113):
For it may well be said that a new life begins when something pre-
viously known inside and out, but still only in parts, is beheld in its 
entirety. Now I see all my childhood dreams come to life; I see now 
in reality the first engravings that I remember (my father had hung 
the prospects of Rome in a corridor); and everything long familiar to 
me in paintings and drawings, copperplates and woodcuts, in plas-
ter and cork, now stands together before me. Wherever I go I find 
something in this new world I am acquainted with; it is all as I imag-
ined, and yet new. And the same can be said of my observations, my 
thoughts. I have had no entirely new thought, have found nothing 
entirely unfamiliar, but the old thoughts have become so precise, so 
alive, so coherent that they can pass for new. 
(MA 15:147/CW 6:104)
Nothing is really new, then, although the old acquaintances appear 
more alive in their original setting. This includes statues as well, which 
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Goethe had often seen as plaster casts at various drawing schools in Ger-
many. Commenting on his experience of the Laocoön group, to which he 
devotes an influential essay, published in the first issue of Die Propyläen 
(1798), he even goes as far as to say that the encounter with the marble 
original— to be sure, he was fully aware of the fact that it was a Roman 
copy of a lost Greek original— did not add anything of substance to the 
interpretation he had made some twenty years earlier in Mannheim, for 
which he accounts in Dichtung und Wahrheit (third part, 1814; MA 
16:537). Although Goethe considers the plaster cast as lifeless in com-
parison to the skin- like marble— whereas the former appears “chalky 
and dead,” in the latter, he notices the “elegant semitransparency of the 
yellowish, nearly flesh- colored stone” (MA 15:178/CW 6:124)—the na-
ture of the material only plays a minor role as, ten years after the return 
from Rome, in “Über Laokoon,” Goethe reflects on his experiences in 
the Vatican Museum.43 On one occasion only does he refer to the phys-
ical material of the group: “I would suggest that you face the sculpture 
from a proper distance, eyes closed. If you open and then immediately 
close your eyes, you can see the whole marble in motion” (MA 4.2:81/
CW 3:18). In the end, the experience of the marble only contributes to 
the already established interpretation based on the experience of an in-
ferior reproduction of the work.
Although Goethe, as his long involvement with the Laocoön group 
shows, might have considered himself an ideal art lover, capable of ap-
preciating the finer details of art even at a young age, he believed that ed-
ucation on aesthetic sensibility was essential in most cases. Thus, in the 
introduction to the journal Die Propyläen, the closest we come to a clas-
sicist program by Goethe’s hand, he writes that
Even  a  rough, imperfect plaster cast of  a  fine ancient work will 
have a strong effect on the viewer who, although inexperienced, is 
receptive to beauty. For even in an inferior reproduction we still 
perceive the idea, the simplicity and grandeur of form, in short, the 
general concept— as much as one with poor eyesight would see when 
looking at the original from a distance.
As we know, such imperfect reproductions often arouse a strong 
interest in art; yet the effect is commensurate with the object. What 
the novice art lover experiences is more an undefined, muddled feel-
ing that the real worth and greatness of the original work. 
(MA 6.2:21–22/CW 3:86–87)
There is  a  practical side to art reproductions which Goethe was not 
only fully aware but also approved of. Even “such imperfect reproduc-
tions” may promote the education of the art lover, though they only 
provide “an undefined, muddled feeling.” This indeterminate feeling 
is a response to the idea of the work, which is palpable even in the most 
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inferior reproduction. In the introduction to Die Propyläen, Goethe out-
lines a kind of progressive methodology that leads the art lover from the 
imperfect copy to the higher spheres of the original:
However, if after more experience and practice they see a finished 
rather than a rough cast, or even an original work, their enjoyment 
together with their insight grows, and increases as they become ac-
quainted with originals, and finally with originals of the highest 
order. 
(MA 6.2:22/CW 3:87)
As Johannes Grave and Jonas Maatsch have aptly suggested, Goethe 
engaged with art “not only ‘historically’ but also ‘progressively’ [stufen-
weise].”44 At the core of the aesthetic experience, then, lies a conception 
of the work of art as essentially multifarious. The original, of course, 
constitutes the ultimate goal of the progressive aesthetic education. 
However, both the unique original and the ever- so- inferior reproduction 
embody the idea of the work and contribute to the complete understand-
ing of it.
Goethe continued to collect reproductions of the works he had seen 
in Italy after his return home. Thanks to these, he was able to continu-
ously refine his understanding of the work. Grave talks about Goethe’s 
comparing gaze, which was intended to “intensify the study of the model 
[Vorlage] as well as of the reproduction.”45 Leonardo da Vinci’s Last 
Supper, for instance, which Goethe saw in Milan on his way back to 
Germany in 1787, was the object of persistent study and resulted in an 
extensive essay thirty years later. This essay deals explicitly with the 
pros and cons of copies, emphasizing the fundamental but nevertheless 
productive difference between these and the original (cf. MA 11.2:416–
418). The experience of the original in itself, clearly, did not provide 
enough material for  a  complete understanding of the work. Rather, 
copies of various sorts— engravings, drawings, plaster casts, and later 
lithographies— facilitated a continuous retrospective reflection.
So far, we have only looked at the receptive side of the aesthetic ex-
perience: namely, the art lover’s encounters with various manifestations 
of works of art and the education of the art lover. Despite having aban-
doned his dreams of becoming a visual artist himself during his sojourn 
in Italy (cf. MA 15:610–611), Goethe remained engaged in the practi-
cal matters of producing art. Together with Johann Heinrich Meyer, 
he used his influence— as writer, editor, Geheimrat, and superintendent 
of the court theater in Weimar— to point the art of his time in a classi-
cist direction. In particular, the prize competitions for visual artists are, 
Ernst Osterkamp explains, “of crucial importance for the understand-
ing of Goethe’s artistical intention during the ‘classical decade,’ as he 
attempted, with great personal stakes, to gain influence on the current 
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development of the fine arts.”46 According to the first announcement, 
published in Die Propyläen in 1799, the two initiators, Goethe and 
Meyer, would suggest “a suitable object [Gegenstand]” (MA 6.2:411), 
usually one or two scenes from Homer’s epic poems, each year. The par-
ticipating artists were asked to submit works that presented the selected 
object in accordance with the artists’ own temper and preferences but 
also with the maxims for selection of aesthetic objects established by 
Goethe and Meyer (MA 6.2:411).
To be sure, the prize competitions turned out to be  a  gigantic fail-
ure47; even within the unfathomable amount of scholarly work on 
Goethe, Osterkamp claims, the texts outlining the themes of the com-
petitions are rarely commented on, unloved as they are by scholars.48 
However, being key works in Goethe’s classicist project, they are vital 
to the understanding of his notion of the aesthetic experience during 
these important years, around 1800. It is obvious that what Goethe and 
Meyer were looking for were not complete works of art but preliminary 
sketches and drawings, which they referred to as Versuche: attempts or 
even  experiments—“Every artist will at each attempt [Versuch], which 
he makes from his own impulse or is prompted to make, contemplate ev-
erything more deeply and penetrate whence no text, regardless how well 
written it may be, could ever lead him” (MA 6.2:411). Sculptors, too, 
were instructed to submit drawings in order to be “judged with proper 
respect to the special conditions of sculpture” (MA 6.2:414). Thus, the 
aim of the competition was ultimately not to produce ideal works of art 
but rather to set “the talent in motion” (MA 6.2:413). As a result, the 
prize money was considered not “as a reward but rather as incitement 
and encouragement” (MA 6.2:413). In other words, Goethe and Meyer 
considered their endeavor as a kind of nudging, through which they gen-
tly pushed the artists of their time in a classicist direction.49
As might be expected, the entries to the competition could hardly be 
called masterpieces. In fact, with few exceptions, they were mostly a great 
disappointment, and the entire endeavor was discontinued in 1805. Nev-
ertheless, Goethe drew some interesting conclusions based on the works 
that were submitted:
We have justly entertained the idea that the formation of a work of art 
can only occur successively. The first hasty draft, the drawing with light 
and shadow, the sketch with colors, the large cartoon are all stages be-
yond which the artist nurtures his work in order to raise it toward the 
final completion in the large painting and gives it only in this form all of 
that which he, with regards to circumstances and skills, is able to give. 
(MA 6.2:420)
The description of the successive formation of the work of art echoes 
the account of the progressive education of the art lover’s engagement 
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with the work. The prize competitions, Goethe seems to suggest, of-
fered the ideal venue for making this processual nature of art visible. 
Not only did they lack an original, apart from Homer’s verse; they also 
enabled a multitude of comparisons between various drafts of the same 
object, whose ideality Homer’s words warranted. “Much,” Goethe and 
Meyer avow, “is already portrayed so vivid, so simple and true in him 
that the fine artist finds his work already half- done” (MA 6.2:512).
What Goethe’s post- Italian account of aesthetic experience— the 
encounter with already familiar works of art, the constantly enlarged 
collection of graphic art for comparison, and the prize competitions— 
boils down to, is that it must be regulated by an idea. The aesthetic 
experience, analogously to the scientific experience, is determined 
by a  regulatory principle: namely, the idea of the work, which, allud-
ing to Kant’s conception of this principle, constitutes the desire to seek 
unity and completeness— what Goethe, in his scientific studies, calls the 
pure phenomenon. Analogous to the constant reconstruction of the pure 
phenomenon in science, the experience of the work’s idea is at the same 
time empirical— it is indeed realized in the work of art and its various 
manifestations (drafts, copies, drawings, plaster casts, etc.)—and con-
stantly postponed and restructured. Striving to grasp the idea of the 
work by means of the multitude of manifestations that it produces— they 
might be of better or worse quality; in either case, they contribute to 
the full experience— resembles the scientist’s exploratory experimenta-
tion, which forms  a  series of preliminary experiences contributing to 
the experience of the pure phenomenon. The possibility or even the ne-
cessity of drafting, copying, imitating, transforming, rearranging, and 
revisiting works of art, including the most celebrated and supposedly 
inimitable ones, and their history is in fact fundamental to the aesthetic 
experience as such. These acts of reconstruction— they might precede 
or succeed the creation of the original— all contribute to the experience 
of the work as a pure phenomenon. Thus, the idea is experienceable in 
the array of the work’s manifestations, which means that the work is 
never only singular. In other words, the work is not construed as a self- 
contained, complete, and perfect entity, that is, autonomous in the sense 
that is often attributed to Moritz. On the contrary, it is essentially expe-
rienceable as another work.
Goethe’s conception of the heteronomous experience of the work of art 
displays a series of analogies to his scientific methodology and may be sum-
marized in three points that correspond to the three points listed above:
1  the work of art is necessarily reproducible and exists as a series of 
manifestations that either proceeds or succeeds the original, and 
that includes visual (drafts, drawings, copies, etc.), verbal (descrip-
tions, ekphrases, etc.), and possibly audial (operas, lieder, etc.) 
representations;
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2  as a  result, the work is collectively produced and involves artists, 
engravers, writers, and musicians;
3  together, the manifestations pertain to  a  regulatory idea, ideally 
manifested in the original masterpiece but not necessarily perceiv-
able in the original since the experience of it presupposes both the 
preparatory education and the succeeding reflection of the observer.
The striking analogies between science and aesthetics in Goethe’s clas-
sicist works indicate  a  common experiential origin. “How  I  used to 
observe nature,  I  now observe art,” Goethe writes from Rome to his 
confident, Charlotte von Stein.50 The analogy between the two forms 
of engaging in the world, the scientific and the aesthetic, denotes not 
some sort of identity between the two but rather, as the key words how 
and observe reveal,  a  connection between modes of investigation: the 
analogy as an exploratory form of knowledge production, open- ended 
and susceptible to what is yet undecided in the concrete experience.51 In 
conclusion, Goethe’s idealism is essentially exploratory, both method-
ologically, relating to the way in which nature and art are investigated, 
and epistemologically, pertaining to the essence of knowledge as such.
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